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Abstract
This paper discusses the optimal firm size in the presence of in-
fluence activities, and the level of individual rent-seeking dependent
on the economic situation of the firm. Since firm size has a discour-
aging effect on the level of individual rent-seeking but also a quantity
effect as the number of rent-seekers increases, the interplay of both ef-
fects determines whether the employer chooses an inefficiently small or
large firm size. In the given setting, a bad economic situation leads to
both a higher probability of a substantial loss and a reduction of pro-
ductivity. The productivity effect and the two other effects together
determine the optimal level of individual rent-seeking.
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1 Introduction
Organization members typically do not only use efficient actions in order to
maximize their expected utility but also inefficient behavior which has been
labeled politicking, internal rent-seeking or influence activities in the liter-
ature (Milgrom 1988, Milgrom and Roberts 1988). Such behavior leads to
costs for the organization but is useful from an individual perspective for
redistributing rents. There exist very different forms of influence activities.
Several forms serve to manipulate performance measures. Often individuals
try to show themselves in a more favorable light,1 but sometimes they want
to hide their lights under a bushel.2 In other situations, division managers
exert activities which influence the internal capital allocation.3 Employees
may want to manipulate job-promotion decisions by bribing their superiors.4
Finally, organization members possibly try to influence relative performance
pay or job-promotion tournaments by sabotaging their opponents.5 Alto-
gether, Gibbons (2005) even speaks of an "elemental rent-seeking theory of
the firm".
This paper discusses the relationship between firm size and influence ac-
tivities and between the economic situation (of the firm) and influence activ-
ities. At first sight, we would expect that employers limit influence costs by
reducing firm size and, therefore, the number of internal rent seekers (Holm-
1For example, there are problems of career concerns (Holmström 1982) and yes-men
problems (Prendergast 1993, Ewerhart and Schmitz 2000).
2This does especially hold for the case of the ratchet effect (e.g. Baron and Besanko
1984).
3See Scharfstein and Stein (2000).
4See Fairburn and Malcomson (1994).
5See Lazear (1989), Konrad (2000).
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ström and Roberts 1998, p. 77).6 This aspect will be referred to as quantity
effect in the paper. However, there may also exist a discouraging effect for
individual rent seekers if the number of opponents becomes large, because
a certain amount of influence activities has a lower relative weight. We will
show that the employer optimally chooses an inefficiently large firm size if this
discouraging effect dominates the quantity effect. Whether the discouraging
or the quantity effect is dominant crucially depends on the given rent-seeking
technology and the workers’ cost functions.
The relationship between the economic situation of the firm and the in-
tensity of individual rent-seeking seems to be ambiguous. On the one hand, it
is possible that a bad situation implies the threat of layoffs which then leads
to increased politicking of the workers who want to protect their jobs (Meyer,
Milgrom and Roberts 1992, Bagwell and Zechner 1993). On the other hand,
a bad economic situation may lead to less individual rent-seeking if workers
expect to forfeit the returns of their influence activities because of the firm
becoming insolvent (Schaefer 1998). In this paper, a bad situation or nega-
tive shock first has a negative productivity effect since the value of marginal
product decreases. This effect reduces the optimal firm size and, therefore,
the discouraging effect which finally results into more individual rent-seeking.
However, in the model a negative shock does not only lead to reduced produc-
tivity but also to a higher probability that the employer bears a substantial
loss. If the discouraging effect is very strong and the firm’s substantial loss
more important than the productivity effect the employer will prefer a large
6As an exception, Konrad (2000) shows that influence activities in form of sabotage
are a special problem of small groups due to free riding of the sabotaging individuals.
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firm size in order to reduce individual and overall rent-seeking. Hence, in
this situation a bad economic situation will be positively correlated with a
low level of individual influence activities.
The setting discussed in this paper fundamentally differs from the ones
used by Meyer, Milgrom and Roberts (1992), Bagwell and Zechner (1993),
and Schaefer (1998) since we assume direct competition between the internal
rent-seekers by explicitly modelling a rent-seeking contest. For this reason,
the discouraging effect cannot appear in the three other papers. Hence, this
paper adds to the existing literature by extending the discussion of firm
size, firm crisis and influence activities on situations with strong internal
competition between the workers who exert influence activities.
There are some other papers which analyze internal rent-seeking contests
in organizations. As one of the first authors, Masten (1986) combines a
formal rent-seeking model with the theory of the firm. He discusses a make-
or-buy decision with possible bargaining and haggling between a seller and
a buyer in the presence of quasi-rents. Müller and Wärneryd (2001) em-
phasize the advantages of outside ownership in the presence of internal rent-
seeking. They use their approach to explain the coexistence of partnerships
and stock corporations. Konrad (2004) shows that organizing rent-seeking
conflicts within a hierarchy may imply lower overall rent seeking expendi-
tures. Inderst, Müller and Wärneryd (2005) point out that a large number
of hierarchy levels may be beneficial for limiting overall rent-seeking. Inderst,
Müller and Wärneryd (2006) stress the benefits of a multi-divisional firm for
reducing internal rent-seeking. In particular, their arguments can be applied
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to explain the replacement of the U-form with the M-form during the twen-
tieth century. Kräkel (2006) shows that efficient and highly profitable firms
may not be founded because of anticipated excessive rent-seeking that will
follow foundation.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces a formal
model on influence activities between competing workers. Section 3 addresses
the relationship of firm size and influence activities. Section 4 deals with the
economic situation (of the firm) and influence activities. In Section 5, the
implications of an endogenous discretionary budget and possible applications
will be discussed. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
We consider a firm with a single employer E and N workers. All individuals
are assumed to be risk neutral. Firm size N is endogenous and optimally
chosen by E.7 By employing N workers, E realizes gross8 profits
π (N) = θ · Y (N)− w ·N (1)
where the exogenous productivity parameter θ > 0 characterizes the eco-
nomic situation of the firm, Y (N) is strictly concave (with Y 0(N) > 0 and
Y 00(N) < 0) and describes the firm’s production function, and w > 0 stands
for a worker’s exogenously given wage rate which exactly covers a worker’s
7Although N is a positive integer, for simplicity N is treated as a continuous variable.
8In the subsequent paragraph, it becomes clear why π(N) denotes "gross" profits.
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effort costs. Moral hazard problems regarding the firm’s production are com-
pletely excluded.
However, internal relationships are not completely covert by explicit con-
tracts. There is a discretionary budget B > 0 which is transferred from E to
the workers due to incomplete contracting inside the firm. For simplicity, B
is exogenously given. The distribution of B among the N workers is deter-
mined by the workers’ choices of influence activities or internal rent-seeking
intensities ai (i = 1, . . . , N). We follow the rent-seeking technology suggested
by Skaperdas (1996) and assume that worker i’s (i = 1, . . . , N) share of B is
given by the contest success function
si (ai) =
f (ai)PN
j=1 f (aj)
(2)
with f (·) as positive increasing and concave function which measures the im-
pact of influence activities ai (i = 1, . . . , N).9 Choosing influence activities ai
leads to direct and indirect costs ci(ai) = c(ai;N) for worker i (i = 1, . . . , N)
with c(0;N) = 0, ∂c/∂ai > 0, ∂2c/∂a2i > 0, ∂c/∂N ≥ 0, and ∂2c/∂ai∂N ≥ 0.
Hence, a worker’s cost function is strictly convex in the magnitude of in-
fluence activities and non-decreasing in firm size. In order to guarantee an
interior solution at the contest stage, the Inada conditions ∂c∂ai |ai=0 = 0 and
∂c
∂ai |ai=+∞ = +∞ are assumed to hold. The function c (ai;N) covers all di-
rect costs of internal rent seeking (e.g. bribe-money, a worker’s opportunity
costs of exerting time consuming influence activities) as well as a worker’s
indirect costs (e.g. expected costs of being punished as internal rent seeker
9For an application to internal rent-seeking see Inderst, Müller and Wärneryd (2006).
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by E and/or the co-workers, expected personal disadvantages due to damag-
ing the firm when exerting ai, for example expected income loss because of
decreased internal career prospects due to a firm decline). Costs c (ai;N) are
assumed to be non-decreasing in firm size because the larger the number of
co-workers the higher will be the probability of being accused of rent-seeking
by at least one co-worker and/or the employer, the higher will be worker i’s
start-up costs for influencing individuals (e.g. i first has to gain each individ-
ual’s confidence), the more information worker i has to acquire about whom
and how to influence, and the larger will be the co-workers’ overall resistance
against worker i’s influence activities, for example.
It is assumed that the firm gets into trouble with probability p
³PN
i=1 ai − αθ
´
where p0 (·) > 0, p” (·) > 0, and α > 0. If such crisis occurs the firm will re-
alize a monetary loss L > 0.10 The probability of a crisis, p
³PN
i=1 ai − αθ
´
,
increases in the total amount of counterproductive influence activities but
decreases in the productivity parameter θ. In other words, if the firm is in a
really good situation, a given amount of internal rent-seeking will only lead
to a rather small probability of a firm crisis, depending on the weighting
factor α.
10Note that worker i’s disadvantages of a firm crisis resulting from influence activities
are incorporated in the worker’s objective function via ci (ai) = c (ai;N).
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The time-schedule of the game is as follows.
1 2 3 4 5
-
Nature E chooses production worker i exerts payments
chooses θ firm size N takes place ai (i = 1, . . . , N)
First, nature chooses the economic situation of the firm, θ, which be-
comes publicly observable. Then, employer E hires N workers depending on
the economic situation and the anticipated worker behavior. Firm size N
determines firm output Y (N) and, therefore, gross profits π (N). Fourth,
each worker i chooses his optimal level of influence activities, ai. Finally,
each individual gets his payoff. Employer E wants to maximize expected net
profits
EUE(N) = π (N)−B − p
Ã NX
i=1
ai − αθ
!
· L (3)
at the second stage, whereas worker i (i = 1, . . . , N) maximizes
EUWi (ai) = w +B
f (ai)PN
j=1 f (aj)
− c (ai;N) (4)
at the fourth stage.
The next section will offer a solution of the game. In Section 4, the impact
of the economic situation of the workers’ equilibrium rent-seeking behavior
is analyzed.
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3 Firm Size and Influence Activities
Before solving the game, the first-best solution is derived as a kind of bench-
mark solution. Under first-best conditions, we have no contractual problems
so that individuals enter a forcing contract which maximizes welfare. Since
from a welfare perspective influence activities only lead to costs, the first-
best level of influence activities simply is aFBi = 0 =: aFB (i = 1, . . . , N).
First-best firm size, NFB, then only maximizes profits π (N) which implies
π0
¡
NFB
¢
= 0⇔ θ · Y 0 ¡NFB¢ = w. (5)
Hence, first-best firm size equalizes the value of marginal product and mar-
ginal labor costs.
Under the incomplete-contract setting described in Section 2, this solution
cannot be implemented because individually rational rent-seeking is positive.
In stage 4 of the game, worker i’s optimal level of internal rent-seeking is
characterized by the first-order condition11
B³PN
j=1 f (aj)
´2 = ∂c/∂aif 0 (ai)Pj 6=i f (aj) . (6)
Note that the first-order condition of any other worker k 6= i yields
B³PN
j=1 f (aj)
´2 = ∂c/∂akf 0 (ak)Pj 6=k f (aj)
11The second-order condition is always satisfied since a worker’s objective function is
strictly concave.
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which, together with equation (6), leads to
∂c/∂ai
f 0 (ai)
X
j 6=k
f (aj) =
∂c/∂ak
f 0 (ak)
X
j 6=i
f (aj) .
Since both sides of the equation describe the same monotonically increasing
function of ai or ak, respectively, we have a symmetric equilibrium in which
each worker chooses influence activities a∗ according to
B (N − 1)
N2 = H (a
∗;N)⇔ a∗ (N) = A
µ
B (N − 1)
N2 ;N
¶
(7)
withH (·;N) := [c0 (a∗;N) · f (a∗)] /f 0 (a∗), c0 (a∗;N) := ∂ci∂ai |ai=a∗, andA (·;N) =
H−1 (·;N). Note that bothH (·;N) andA (·;N) are monotonically increasing
in the first argument. By implicit differentiation we obtain
∂a∗
∂N =
−B(N−2)N3 −
f(a∗)
f 0(a∗)
∂2c(a∗;N)
∂a∗∂N
∂H (a∗;N) /∂a∗ < 0. (8)
According to (8), an individual worker’s equilibrium level of internal rent-
seeking is decreasing in firm size N . This effect can be labeled discouraging
effect : The larger the number of co-workers, the lower will be the relative
impact of individual rent-seeking which then leads to lower incentives for
rent-seeking.
Now we can solve the second stage of the game where employer E has to
decide on the optimal firm size. E maximizes
EUE (N) = π (N)−B − p (N · a∗ (N)− αθ)L.
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The first-order condition12 gives
π0 (N) = p0 (Na∗ (N)− αθ)L ·
·
a∗ (N) +N ∂a
∗
∂N
¸
. (9)
Let N ∗ denote the solution of equation (9). Then we have the following
proposition:
Proposition 1 N∗ > (<)NFB iff a∗ (N∗) +N∗a∗0 (N∗) < (>) 0.
Proof. The gross profit function π (N) is strictly concave with a unique
maximum at NFB with π0
¡
NFB
¢
= 0. If a∗ (N∗) +N∗a∗0 (N∗) < (>) 0, the
solution N∗ will be to the right (left) of NFB.
The result of Proposition 1 shows that the employer will choose an inef-
ficiently large (small) firm size, if the expression in brackets in equation (9)
is negative (positive). This expression describes the trade-off between two
effects from marginally increasing N . The first term, a∗ (N∗), can be referred
to as quantity effect: The more workers E employs, the larger will be the
number of individuals each exerting influence activities a∗ (N∗), respectively.
This effect makes E favor an inefficiently small firm size. The second term,
N∗a∗0 (N∗), describes the discouraging effect mentioned above which always
works into the opposite direction. Altogether, whether employer E prefers a
small or a large firm size depends on which of the two effects is dominant.
Of course, since N is endogenous the employer’s choice of firm size should
be decisive for the dominance of the two effects. However, for certain spec-
12To guarantee an interior solution, we assume that the second-order conditon
EU 00E (N) = π00 (N) −p00 (·)
£ ∂
∂N (Na∗ (N))
¤2 L −p0 (·) h2∂a∗∂N +N ∂2a∗∂N2 iL < 0 is satisfied.
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ifications of the contest success function and the cost function the algebraic
sign of the expression in brackets on the right-hand side of (9) is always
positive or always negative:
Corollary 2 Let f (ai) = ai. (i) If c (ai;N) = a
2
i
2
, then N∗ < NFB. (ii) If
c (ai;N) = γ(N)a
2
i
2
with γ(N)/N being strictly convex, then N∗ > NFB.
Proof. (i) In this scenario, we obtain a∗ (N) =
p
B (N − 1)/N, andNa∗ (N) =p
B (N − 1) which is monotonically increasing in N . (ii) Now we have
Na∗ (N) =
q
B(N−1)
γ(N) with
∂
∂N (Na
∗ (N)) = B
2
s
γ (N)
B (N − 1)
γ (N)− (N − 1) γ0 (N)
γ (N)2
. (10)
Since γ (N) /N is strictly convex, the function γ (N) /N2 is monotonically
increasing, i.e.
d
dN
µ
γ (N)
N2
¶
=
γ0 (N)N − 2γ (N)
N3 > 0,
which implies that (10) and, hence, the term in brackets in (9) are always
negative because N ≥ 2.
The corollary deals with a rather simple rent-seeking technology as in-
troduced by Tullock (1980). For a quadratic cost function which does not
include firm size N , the quantity effect dominates the discouraging effect
(result (i)). However, if firm size has an influence on individual rent-seeking
costs, the discouraging effect may dominate the quantity effect even under
the simple Tullock contest success function for all N ≥ 2 (result (ii)).
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4 Economic Situation and Influence Activi-
ties
The economic situation (of the firm) is characterized by the productivity
parameter θ. This parameter influences the value of marginal product and
the firm’s probability of a crisis. In order to analyze whether a good or a
bad economic situation is positively correlated with a high individual level
of internal rent-seeking, we first have to discuss the effect of a change of θ on
the optimal firm size N∗. From Section 3 we know that N∗ is described by
equation (9). Implicit differentiation yields
∂N∗
∂θ =
Y 0 (N∗) + p00 (N∗a∗ (N∗)− αθ)αL [a∗ (N∗) +N∗a∗0 (N∗)]
−EU 00E (N∗)
. (11)
Since ∂a∗/∂N < 0 we obtain the following result:
Proposition 3 da∗/dθ < (>) 0 iff
Y 0 (N∗) + p00 (N∗a∗ (N∗)− αθ)αL [a∗ (N∗) +N∗a∗0 (N∗)] > (<) 0.
The proposition shows that a high individual level of influence activities
may be positively correlated either with a good or a bad economic situa-
tion. The intuition for this result is the following: First note that, in the
given setting, the situation or productivity parameter θ directly influences
the optimal firm sizeN∗ which then determines individual influence activities
a∗ (N∗); due to the discouraging effect optimal rent-seeking a∗(N∗) decreases
in firm size. The numerator of the right-hand side of equation (11) consists
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of two terms. The first term, Y 0 (N), describes the marginal productivity
which is always positive. Hence, according to this productivity effect the em-
ployer will increase the optimal firm size if θ becomes larger. The second
term, p00 (N∗a∗ (N∗)− αθ)αL [a∗ (N∗) +N∗a∗0 (N∗)], can be shortly written
as −∂2p/∂θ∂N∗ which describes how the marginal probability of a crisis
reacts to an increase of firm size. If the quantity effect dominates the dis-
couraging effect, the term in brackets and, therefore, −∂2p/∂θ∂N∗ will be
positive.13 If the discouraging effect is dominant, the opposite will hold.
Altogether, we have to differentiate between two cases: (1) Given a domi-
nance of the quantity effect, we unambiguously have da∗/dθ < 0, i.e. individ-
ual rent-seeking increases when the economic situation of the firm becomes
worse. The other way round, individual rent-seeking will decrease, if the eco-
nomic situation of the firm becomes better. Note that in the initial situation
the firm size is inefficiently small (see Proposition 1). If θ increases, first as a
result of the productivity effect the employer will prefer to enlarge the firm
towards the efficient size NFB. Second, because of the dominant quantity
effect the marginal probability of a crisis decreases in N∗ (∂2p/∂θ∂N∗ < 0)
which makes enlargement of the firm also attractive for employer E. Hence,
the employer is unambiguously interested in increasing N∗ which leads to
less internal rent-seeking by each worker.
(2) If the discouraging effect dominates the quantity effect, initially we
have an inefficiently large firm size (see Proposition 1). Again, an increase
of θ leads to the same productivity effect as in case (1) which would result
13Note that p00 (·) > 0, by assumption.
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in an increase of N∗. However, the dominance of the discouraging effect
over the quantity effect now works into the opposite direction; the marginal
probability of a crisis increases in N∗ which favors a decline of firm size from
the employer’s viewpoint. If, in this situation, the discouraging effect is very
strong and dominates both quantity and productivity effect, the employer
will be interested in reducing firm size. The reduction of N∗ then results
into a higher level of influence activities by each worker. If the discouraging
effect does not dominate the other two effects, again the employer will prefer
a larger firm size which implies less rent-seeking by each worker. Note that,
if the discouraging effect dominates the quantity effect (i.e. the term in
brackets is negative), then the larger the employer’s loss in case of a crisis,
L, and the larger the impact of the economic situation on the probability of
a crisis, α, the more likely will be a reduction of firm size. More generally,
how the employer reacts to a productivity increase will depend on whether
he is more concerned about the production process or about internal frictions
such as influence activities.
5 Discussion
Up to now, the discretionary budget B has been assumed to be exogenous.
While this simplifying assumption makes the analysis quite concise it will
not hold in general. In this section, the consequences of an endogenous B
will de discussed. Furthermore, I would like to discuss some applications of
the theoretical results.
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5.1 Endogenous Budget B
Following Milgrom and Roberts (1992, pp. 573—574) we can assume that the
discretionary budget increases in firm size:
B = β (N) with β0 (N) > 0. (12)
Assumption (12) adds two effects to the former analysis. First, since a∗
is increasing in B now there is an additional effect (incentive effect) when
choosing N which directly works against the discouraging effect. Regarding
Proposition 1, an inefficiently small firm size becomes more attractive for the
employer. If the incentive effect strictly dominates the original discourag-
ing effect so that ∂a∗/∂N > 0, we will obtain the clear-cut result that the
employer always chooses an inefficiently small firm size. Second, note that
the employer’s objective function (3) decreases in the discretionary budget
B. According to (12) the transfer B from E to the workers increases in firm
size. This distribution effect makes an inefficiently small firm size even more
advantageous for employer E.
When reconsidering Proposition 3 and focusing on the incentive effect, we
have to differentiate between two scenarios: (i) If the incentive effect weakens
the discouraging effect but is not dominant, then ∂a∗/∂N < 0 will still hold.
Because of the diminished discouraging effect it becomes more likely that
the productivity effect and the quantity effect are dominant so that (11) is
16
positive and we have
da∗
dθ =
∂a∗
∂N∗|{z}
<0
∂N∗
∂θ|{z}
>0
< 0.
In this scenario, a better economic situation alleviates the influence-activities
problem. (ii) However, if the incentive effect is very strong and completely
outweighs the discouraging effect, we will have ∂a∗/∂N > 0. In this case,
each of the terms in expression a∗ (N∗)+N∗a∗0 (N∗) in (11) is positive which
implies
da∗
dθ =
∂a∗
∂N∗|{z}
>0
∂N∗
∂θ|{z}
>0
> 0.
In the initial situation, firm size is inefficiently small. An improved economic
situation (i.e. an increase in θ) has two implications. First, the productivity
effect makes enlargement of N beneficial for the employer. Second, the mar-
ginal probability of a crisis decreases in N which also fosters increasing N .
Altogether, a better economic situation unambiguously makes the employer
increase firm size. This also happens in scenario (i). However, since in sce-
nario (ii) the incentive effect is absolutely dominant, the main consequence
is a strict increase of influence activities due to a higher discretionary budget
following enlarged firm size.
As an alternative to assumption (12), we can assume that the discre-
tionary budget depends on profits so that
B = γ (π) with γ0 (π) > 0. (13)
This specification leads to similar consequences as assumption (12). Again,
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we would have a kind of incentive effect ∂a∗/∂γ · γ0 (π) > 0 and a kind of
distribution effect ∂EUE/∂γ · γ0 (π) < 0. Compared to the case of an ex-
ogenous B, now employer E has less incentives to choose first-best firm size
NFB which maximizes π. In particular, if the quantity effect is dominant,
E will prefer an inefficiently small firm size to deviate from maximum prof-
its. Furthermore, if the incentive effect is quite strong, a better economic
situation (i.e. an increase in θ) will again lead to a higher level of influence
activities since a∗ is increasing in π which is increasing in θ.
5.2 Applications
Finally, we can think about possible implications of the theoretical findings.
In the given setting, employer E optimally chooses firm size N while bearing
in mind the effects on influence activities being chosen by the workers at the
next stage of the game. Moreover, the employer can directly affect the level
of influence activities by his choice of firm size. For example, if the quantity
effect is very strong and E wants to reduce overall influence activities, he
might choose divestitures such as spin-offs in order to reduce N .
However, the results have also shown that other motives (e.g. technolog-
ical considerations) are more important for the employer when choosing firm
size. In these situations, the theoretical findings can still help to shed some
light on secondary effects like internal politicking. Consider, for example,
the case of a merger. When employer E acquires another firm in order to
increase profits by generating synergy or a higher market concentration, this
transaction has diverse implications on the intensity of influence activities.
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If the acquired firm is not completely closed, firm size N will increase. On
the one hand, increased firm size enlarges the number of internal rent seekers
(quantity effect). On the other hand, an individual rent seeker is discour-
aged. Moreover, if the discretionary budget is endogenously determined by
firm size N or profits π the incentive effect of Subsection 5.1 will apply, which
results in higher individual incentives for internal politicking. In addition,
the distribution effect of Subsection 5.1 will lead to another disadvantage
for the employer. Altogether, if the amount of additional influence activities
is quite large the employer might decide to forgo a merger that would be
efficient in the absence of influence activities.14
Finally, the results can be applied to Williamson’s "Chronic Puzzle"
(Williamson 1985, pp. 132—135): He reconsiders the provoking question
raised by Coase (1937) why there does not exist a single global corpora-
tion. This corporation should not act worse than the market because of
selective intervention. In those instances where the corporation cannot do
better than the market, it should simply replicate the market; but whenever
market performance can be improved the corporation should do so. Hence,
the puzzle remains why we do not observe one completely centralized cor-
poration. There may exist several answers to this question; for example,
Williamson’s one is "that selective intervention is not feasible" (Williamson
1985, p. 135). However, the results on influence activities in firms offer a very
promising argument for explaining why prohibitively high internal transac-
tion costs naturally limit firm size. As the quantity effect and the incentive
14There are parallels to the "adverse selection" result of Kräkel (2006) in the context of
founding organizations.
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effect should be of some importance in practice, economic activity should be
split up into several firms of limited size for efficiency reasons.
6 Conclusions
When considering firm size and influence activities or internal rent-seeking,
at first sight one might suppose that the employer should reduce firm size in
order to cut down the intensity of internal politicking. However, the results
have shown that, on the contrary, an increase of firm size will reduce influ-
ence activities, if individual rent seekers are discouraged by a large number
of opponents. Furthermore, the paper shows that the relationship between a
firm crisis and the level of influence activities is ambiguous. On the one hand,
a bad economic situation makes production less productive. Therefore, the
employer should adjust firm size downwards which leads to a smaller number
of rent seekers but a higher intensity of individual rent-seeking since each
individual becomes less discouraged. On the other hand, a bad economic
situation leads to a higher probability that the employer will bear a sub-
stantial loss. If this potential loss is sufficiently large and, in addition, the
discouraging effect sufficiently strong, the employer will optimally react by
increasing firm size in order to make use of the discouraging effect.
The given analysis is based on the assumption that internal relations are
only covered by incomplete contracts which leave room for politicking and
haggling. As a consequence, we completely abstract from any contract so-
lutions. However, from a principal-agent perspective one might think about
20
further contractual aspects. For example, recall that we have assumed the
absence of any incentive problems regarding production. Hence, workers’
participation constraints should always be binding in the employer’s opti-
mum. But then reducing firm size would imply that a worker’s individual
share in the discretionary budget increases so that the employer should re-
duce the contractual wage rate in order to keep the participation constraint
binding. Another issue would arise when introducing incentive problems into
firm production. Besides the usual incentive problems due to limited liabil-
ity or risk aversion, anticipated internal rent-seeking would further reduce
incentives at the production stage because each individual will loose part of
his fruits. Finally, collusion among the workers can be considered. Note that
the workers are in a prisoners’-dilemma-like situation: In the symmetric equi-
librium, each worker gets the same share in the discretionary rent. Hence,
they can collectively gain by reducing rent-seeking activities to zero in order
to save on effort costs. In a repeated-game context such collusion might be
stable implying also a substantial benefit for the employer. Of course, in the
presence of incentive problems in production, a collusion between the workers
would have a rather ambivalent character.
21
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